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Abstract
In this paper we propose a framework based on argumentation that can be used to support
deliberative discourse on line. Online communities have several distinct advantages as very
open forums but they also have some deep disadvantages. We argue that the proposed
framework and web application GAAMtalk permits and encourages the positive elements of
online deliberation that will enhance discussions.
Keywords
Argumentation, deliberative discourse, online discourse, virtual communities, decision
support

INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web as a communication medium and forum for a liberal exchange of
information and personal expression has considerable potential for supporting group
decision-making. A large range of possible scenarios can be imagined, from a small panel of
jurists considering a current case to a virtual community discussing a particular issue with an
aim of reaching agreement. In envisioning the utility key structural considerations need to be
addressed to move towards implementations of systems to provide effective support. Some
of the important questions are:
•

What rules and tools would an online community need in order for it to engage in
effective, meaningful debate so that decisions are generally accepted by its
members?

•

Can online communities produce a better-informed and more responsible
constituency?

•

Can online, and increasingly off-line as well – communities govern themselves
online?
Our sense of how traditional communities operate is well developed as their existence has
been documented over thousands of years. In contrast, online communities are only a few
decades old, and the large difference evident between the two leaves us without the full
benefit of the lessons of experience. For example, members of self-organizing online
communities come to one another and communicate as equals, stripped of many of the
social cues present in physical encounters. Much of the effective “social glue” that binds
physical communities is lacking in their online counterparts. As well as this, various physical
constraints that keep traditional geo-communities together in times of significant
disagreement and conflict are also missing.
Although open communities on the web are usually formed by those who share like values
and a desire to use their shared online spaces for communication, virtual communities rarely
achieve long-term peaceful existence, the ability to adequately inform themselves as a group
or discuss and decide important issues. Greater anonymity online encourages both valuable
conversations among those who would not normally interact off-line and the recognition and
respect of views that would otherwise never be heard. It also fosters an irresponsibility that
deeply undermines online discussions. Off-topic comments, disagreements about process,
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and much pointless discussion without decision-making are common. As a consequence,
many online groups have resorted to moderators and filtering.
Governance of online communities requires the consent of the participants to a greater
degree than physical communities. However, unlike off-line jurisdictions, online groups have
no significant means by which to force their members to remain involved. This is a difference
from ordinary communities in that, not even the presence of members of self-organizing
online communities is assured. At any time, without reason a member can simply leave the
community, sacrificing their social and intellectual investment usually without penalty.
The central claim advanced in this article is that on-line discussions can be regulated for the
benefit of all participants with the use of a normative reasoning structure. The structure
captures important elements of reasoning within the field of discourse of concern to the
community and, by and large, is acceptable to the community. The structure can be created
and maintained by the community itself or it may be created and maintained by a social
institution. The structure represents a shared understanding of the field of discourse and
acts as way of enhancing community identity.
Participants express their claims and beliefs with the use of the normative structure. The
structure provides a mechanism for organizing the claims made by potentially thousands of
participants. Supporting evidence for claims advanced by participants, typically expressed
using links to documents, can be coherently organized by linking the evidence into the
appropriate node within the structure. In this way, documents are efficiently collected and
collated within the reasoning context of their use.
In moving between communities, documents play an important role, bringing people from
different groups together to negotiate and coordinate common practices. Such negotiations
are particularly significant in institutions, bureaucracies and corporations that comprise many
different communities. The direction of the institution as a whole may depend on the
successful outcome of negotiations among its constituent groups. Both the means and a
willingness to come to a shared understanding are vital to the effectiveness of such
institutions. Within online communities the views, thoughts and arguments are put forward
as documents albeit possibly less structured (as comments on a news group). It becomes a
key requirement within the online community to collectively develop the broad terms of
reference of the discourse or in fact the key elements and agreed structure of the discourse.
The normative structure that we propose is based on a particular model of the “shared
understanding” of the domain of discourse. This model is a graph of generic arguments that
can be used to represent any argument in the domain. In the next section, argumentation
concepts are introduced as background for the description of the model called the generic
actual argument model (GAAM) in section 3. The application of the model for on-line
communities is described in section 4.

ARGUMENTATION
A number of researchers in recent years have assumed that knowledge is often used in
arguing for or against an assertion and have therefore used argumentation theories to model
reasoning. The philosopher Toulmin (1958) concluded that all arguments, regardless of the
domain, have a structure that consists of six basic invariants: claim, data, modality, rebuttal,
warrant and backing. Every argument makes an assertion based on some data. The
assertion of an argument stands as the claim of the argument. Knowing the data and the
claim does not necessarily convince us that the claim follows from the data. This is achieved
by the warrant. The backing supports the warrant and in a legal argument is typically a
reference to a statute or a precedent case. The rebuttal component specifies an exception or
condition that obviates the claim.
Stranieri et al. (2001) draw a distinction between dialectical and non-dialectical applications
of argumentation concepts. Dialectical approaches are those that deploy argumentation
concepts to represent the process of exchanging messages between participants to a
discourse. Dialectical approaches typically adopt a non-monotonic logic and often use
operators that derive from discourse analysis such as assert or rebut. Recent examples of
dialectical approaches can be found in Farley and Freeman (1995), Prakken (1993a), Poole
(1988), Gordon (1995), Cohen (1985), and Fox (1986), Vreeswijk (1993) and Dung (1995).
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In contrast to the dialectical approach, argumentation has also been used to structure or
organize knowledge. For example, Marshall (1989) and Ball (1994) developed hypertext
based systems that structured knowledge using the Toulmin structure. Dick (1991) indexed
cases using the Toulmin structure to improve information retrieval and Clark (1991)
represented the views of individual geologists using the structure.
Drawing the dialectical/ non-dialectical distinction enables the specification of a framework
called the Generic Actual Argument Model (GAAM) that is expressly non-dialectical. Our aim
is to advance a framework that a discursive community agrees is sufficiently general to
enable every participant to express their own claims and beliefs no matter how divergent the
claims are yet provides a framework for the organization of claims into a coherent body. The
framework does not provide a norm for reasoning but instead advances a normative
structure for reasoning.
The use of a normative structure for reasoning enables the integration of information
systems into discursive communities. Specifically, the framework enables the development
of knowledge based systems that integrate a variety of inference procedures, combine
information retrieval with reasoning and facilitate automated document drafting.
Furthermore, the non-dialectical GAAM provides the foundation for simple dialectical
models. Systems based on our approach have been developed in family law, refugee law,
determining eligibility for government legal aid, copyright law and eTourism.

THE GENERIC/ ACTUAL ARGUMENT MODEL
As Stranieri et al. (2001) illustrate the majority of applications of Toulmin’s structure actually
vary the structure in one way or another. The variations can be understood as attempts to
add dialectical features into a structure that is essentially non-dialectical. In the generic
actual argument model, we vary the Toulmin structure in order to arrive at a frame that is
expressly non-dialectical.
An important aspect of our modification is the principle that most arguments, reasoning or
justifications within a field of discourse can be represented as a set of generic arguments
which link together to form a tree or graph structure. Each generic argument represents a
class of actual arguments that may be made and structurally embodies the components that
go towards shaping well considered decision making in uncertain domains.
Generic arguments

Inference
Procedure
Data

Reasons for
relevance

Claim

Reasons for
Inference
Procedure

Backing

Figure 1: A basic outline of our version of a Toulmin argument
Figure 1 represents the basic template for the knowledge representation we call a generic
argument. A generic argument is an instantiation of the template that models a group of
actual arguments. The generic argument includes:
•

A variable-value representation of the claim with a certainty slot

•

A variable-value representation of the data items (with certainty slots) as the
grounds on which such claims are made

•

Reasons for relevance of the data items
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•

Inference procedures that may be used to infer a claim value from data values

• Reasons for the appropriateness of the inference procedure.
The idea is that the generic argument sets up a template for arguments that allows the
representation of the claim and the grounds for the claim. The claim of a generic argument is
a predicate with an unspecified value (which can be chosen from a set when an actual
argument is being made). A claim takes the form <PREFIX>{VALUES}<SUFFIX> as seen
later in Figure 4. Each data item is also a predicate with an unspecified value that can be
taken from a specified set of values. The connection between the data variables and the
claim variable is called an inference mechanism. An inference mechanism is a relation
between the data space and the claim space.
It is important to appreciate that the notion of a generic argument can be used to capture a
shared understanding about what a core set of arguments in a domain are. In some respects
there is some similarity to ‘topic theory’ (see Aristotle 1928, Alexy, 1989) in that an important
aspect in constructing each generic argument is a search for the premises or grounds for
that argument. The generic argument represents the results of this search as the data items
articulated and their reasons for relevance. These are considered to be ‘nearly’ complete
knowledge about the possible grounds for that argument. As such they would include
general exclusionary reasons as described by Raz (1990) which are often the basis for
rebuttals.
Establishing the generic arguments in a domain provides considerable structure for
developing arguments. Engisch (1960) observes that ‘reaching a conclusion as such gives
rise to a minimum of effort; the main difficulty lies in finding premises for it’. We argue that
establishing the generic arguments in a domain is an effective part of acquiring,
representing, reasoning and providing justification and transparency for decision making.
In our generic argument the Toulmin warrant has been translated to the inference
mechanism, the reasons for relevance of the data items and the reasons for the inference
mechanism. The Toulmin rebuttal is not explicitly represented but would be captured within
this structure as a different instance argument possibly using a different inference
mechanism that produces different claim values.
Explicitly representing the inference method enables the use of a variety of inference
mechanisms. For example, the method used to infer an assertion in the family law
application, Split Up described by Stranieri et al. (1999) is a rule for some arguments and a
neural network for others. Branting (1994) provides a framework that captures legal
reasoning using both rules and exemplars. In his framework, rules and exemplars differ
primarily in that exemplars are much less abstract than rules and can be used to provide a
bridge between the abstract rule descriptions and the specific case descriptions. A
knowledge representation framework that separates the inference method from other
components is very flexible. We argue that our argument based approach captures the
granularity of reasoning necessary in the most appropriate way by:
•

Collectively deciding on a set of generic arguments

•

Collectively agreeing on the choice of inference mechanisms

•

Allowing actual arguments to be built by instantiating generic arguments. In fact
agreeing on the set of values that claims and data items may be drawn from

• Allowing actual arguments to be built that extend the generic set.
Each generic argument has a claim, data items, reasons for why each data item is relevant,
the names of the associated inference mechanisms and reasons for their appropriateness.
Figure 2 shows a generic argument in greater detail. It consists of: a conjunction of data
items or slots each with a reason for its relevance and the backing for this; a choice of
inference mechanisms and the reasons for each one of these mechanisms and of course,
the claim slot. All data slots act as input to the inference mechanisms. Each inference
mechanism in the inference mechanism slot provides a means of reaching a claim value
from the input data values. Inference mechanisms may include rule sets, trained neural
networks, case-based reasoners or human reasoning. The choice of a particular inference
mechanism (other than human inferencing) and the reasons for that inference mechanism
provide a reason for arriving at a particular claim value. In the case of human inferencing
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there will still be a need to provide a justification for the claim. At the generic argument level
this explanation cannot be given.
Context
Global
Variables
Variable 1
Variable 2
.
.
Variable n

Conjunction of data
slots
[v11...v1n]

D1
Certainty
D2
Certainty
D3
Certainty
Reasons for
relevance
Backing
Reasons for
relevance
Backing
Reasons for
relevance
Backing

Choice of
Inference
Procedure
Rule Set 1
Trained
ANN
CBR
.
.
.

Certainty

Claim slot
Certainty

Human
inferencing
Reason for
inference
procedure
Reason for
...
.
.
.
Reason for ..

Figure 2: Full representation of a generic argument
Figure 2 also includes certainty slots for each data item, claim and inference mechanism.
These recognise that there is uncertainty in the processes of developing actual arguments.
The certainty values are assigned when values are assigned in the process of constructing
an actual argument. A generic argument is an agreed approximation to a world but still may
only be partial knowledge. We do not explicitly put a certainty or confidence value on a
generic argument although we permit generic arguments to change over time. The structure
of generic arguments that describe a domain will not be static. As knowledge within the
domain evolves new versions of the generic argument structure will be required. New factors
emerge as being relevant to some arguments and new inference mechanisms may be
needed as new legal rules emerge or new cases become precedents. Most actual
arguments in a domain are then underpinned by a particular version of the generic argument
structure.
The knowledge in a domain of discourse can be represented as a tree of these generic
arguments with a data item of an argument being the claim of another argument. The
generic arguments within a domain can be established by engaging participants in the
discussion in the development of the generic argument structure (GAS). The intention is to
have participants agree on a structure for reasoning developed from their shared
understanding. The open textured nature of many areas of reasoning mitigates against the
representation of all arguments in a domain as generic arguments but a large proportion of
arguments in many domains can be represented in this way. It is also useful to know when
particular actual arguments diverge from instantiations of generic arguments and to detect
whether or not they are accepted.
Actual arguments
Actual arguments made are instances of a generic argument where each data slot has a
value, an inference mechanism can be chosen and executed to deliver a value for the claim
slot. Figure 3 illustrates an actual argument with data values set and the particular inference
mechanism selected is human inferencing. With human inferencing there is no reason for
the inference mechanism given at the generic level and there is therefore a need to justify
the claim value produced by the human inference. This is represented in the diagram as the
claim value reason slot.
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Figure 4 is an instantiated generic argument from Refugee Law where the claim is “The
applicant may have a chance of harassment due to political opinion”, based on the data
items and values given in the diagram1. The claim value asserted in the Figure “may have”
needs to be justified and this justification is the claim value reason that is provided at the
stage of making an actual argument rather than at the generic argument stage.
Set Context
Values for global
variables
Var 1 = value
Var 2 = value
.
.
Var n = value

Conjunction of data
slots with values
D1
v1
Certainty = c1

D2
v2
Certainty = c2

D3
v3
Certainty = c3

Choice of
Inference
Procedure
Rule Set 1
Trained
ANN
.
.
.

Claim value
Certainty = c

Human
Human
Inferencing
inferencing
Certainty

Claim value
reason

Figure 3: An instance of a generic argument
Situations will arise where an argument needs to be made for which no generic argument
exists. In these cases, a new argument specific to that situation is created. Ultimately, the
series of actual arguments made in a case is built and represents the full argument in that
situation. Some of the arguments are instances of generic arguments, others are newly
created.
Context
Applicant = X
Country = CH
Year = 2000
Month = August

On the basis of
association
with others the
applicant is ...
to be targeted

unlikely
Cert = 1
Inference
Procedure
Human
inference

Practices in the
country are ... to
unlikely
target the
Cert = 0.5
applicant in the
future
Taken together,
the incidents in
the past ...
constitute
harassment due
to political
opinion

certainly
Cert = 1

The applicant
... a chance of
harassment
due to political
opinion

may have
Cert = 0.9

Amnesty
International
Report
Although policy
has changed
there are still
some reports
of harassment

Reasons for
relevance
Backing

Figure 4: Reasoning from text in an instance argument in Refugee Law

1

The decision maker may have chosen as an inference mechanism, a rule set which contained a rule “If harassment
on the basis of association is unlikely and practices and policies in the country are unlikely to target the applicant
then the applicant may have a chance of harassment due to political opinion”. The justification for this claim would
come from the reasons for the rules in this rule set and its appropriateness for reasoning with this data about this
claim. This is what would be called deductive justification by MacCormick (1978)
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENERIC ARGUMENT STRUCTURE IN ONLINE
DELIBERATIVE DISCOURSE
How do we move on from the collection of heterogeneously structured documents and
comments that make up the discourse provided by electronic media such as news groups or
bulletin boards? Many online publications enable readers to respond directly to an article
and to have that feedback appear directly below the article in a kind of “threaded discussion”
format. A perfect example of this is ZDNet’s Anchordesk. Publications can implement this
process as a stand alone feature or they can integrate it with existing discussion boards.
CoNote is a computer supported cooperative work system designed to facilitate
communication within a group via the use of shared annotations on a set of documents
reported by Davis (1995). The central idea underlying CoNote is that shared annotations
provide an effective forum for groups whose work involves frequent reference to some set of
documents. The key difference is that the documents being annotated provide a context for
the group discussions. This context enables people to find relevant discussions more easily.
The shared annotations model also provides a more structured forum than tools for shared
authoring, because the documents play the role of a (relatively) fixed context for discussions.
Seen this way, shared documents within communities are in many ways the grounds for
disagreement or agreement. Documents are the beginning rather than the end of the
process of negotiation, providing a shared context for constructing meaning. Huizinga (1972)
was particularly critical of the teaching of writing in the United States. Writing was presented
to students as the outcome of deliberation whereas, Huizinga maintained, it was really just
another part of the deliberative process. This view of the document as a medium or resource
for negotiation suggests that one avenue for technological development lies in improving the
means for negotiation.
The Generic Argument Structure provides a means for improving negotiation and
deliberation. Within the community a GAS provides a constant reminder of the agreed upon,
shared understanding and interpretative assumptions. Between communities it provides a
public face to the elaboration and explanation as well as the possibility to encourage
participation.
The GAS can be developed in two ways. Participants to a dialogue can collectively
deliberate on a structure that will suit as the desired normative structure. Alternatively, a
social institution can be charged with the advancement and on-going maintenance of a GAS.
Once a GAS is developed for the community then discourse using the structure can
proceed.
An example of the latter approach can be imagined in a futuristic legal setting. The social
institution charged with the maintenance of the GAS would be the Court that has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the discourse. For example, a future Family Court may advance a
GAS. All concepts that are relevant for a Family Court judgment and precisely how each
relates to others is explicitly represented in the GAS. Claims made by all parties to a dispute
are made as actual arguments instantiated from the GAS. In this way, points of divergence
can more readily be identified and information systems can more easily be integrated to
support reasoning. Ultimately, a Court judgment is also represented as an instantiation of
the GAS ensuring a transparency of reasoning that is well beyond current practice.
Discursive communities that have no social institution that can be appropriately charged with
the maintenance of a GAS can develop their own GAS. The construction of the generic
argument structure can be carried out through structured dialogue between GAAMtalk (a
web version of our argumentation tool) and participants. The basis of this structured
dialogue is the repeated use of a meta generic argument structure. The final GAS developed
will be the one that has the strongest arguments in its favour. It sets the structure of
reasoning and debate for the community on the particular matter for deliberation. A step
toward Afshar et al. (2002) describes Consult, a system that enables a community to engage
in a Delphi-like communication and a Borda preferendum vote in order to agree on a generic
argument structure.
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The meta generic arguments are:
1. The top level generic argument claim is: <PREFIX><VALUE><SUFFIX> {is/ is
not} the top level claim. At this stage <VALUE> is left unspecified.
2. <VALUE SET> {is/ is not} the agreed set of values for the top level claim.
3. <PREFIX><VALUE><SUFFIX> {is/ is not} a data item for the claim.
4. <REASON FOR RELEVANCE> {is/ is not} a reason for the relevance of the data
item.
5. <BACKING> {is/ is not} is the backing for the <REASON FOR RELEVANCE>.
These can be organised into a tree with the top level claim that the GAS that emerges is the
currently agreed GAS for the discourse. Each of the above meta generic arguments then
acts as grounds for this top level claim. The subject of Argument 1 is moved, seconded and
voted upon. Once the generic form of the top level claim is established the grounds on which
such a claim will be made are adduced. “<PREFIX><VALUE><SUFFIX> {is/ is not} a data
item for the claim”, has to be moved and seconded. The support for the data item is then
measured. In the case that the support is judged to be sufficient then the reasons supporting
the claim (a document) are stored as <REASON FOR RELEVANCE>. <BACKING> is then
dealt with in a similar fashion and then the discourse will move onto the next grounds or data
item in turn. The appropriate meta generic arguments are iteratively applied until there is
agreement not to go any further.
The collaborative development of the generic structure provides a framework for the
development of actual arguments. It involved the contribution of reasons (these are attached
as documents) as to why data items are relevant and participants are now in a position to
construct their actual arguments. The structure can be displayed as a tree in one of the
Windows of GAAMtalk and the contents of each node displayed as each node is traversed.
Once a generic argument structure has been established, participants can start to use the
structure to develop their actual arguments. For a participant to develop their own argument,
they can build an actual argument tree in another window of GAAMtalk by selecting nodes
from the generic tree and selecting a value to complete the claim from the set of values in
that generic argument. Reasons for the particular claim value need to be given at this stage2.
These are attached as documents supporting the particular claim value used. GAAMtalk
allows one participant’s argument tree to be compared with another. It also uses an
algorithm developed by Yearwood et al. (1999) to draft a document for each participant from
their argument tree that sets out their argument as a structured document in XML. There is a
tight coupling between the XML and the argument tree so that text in the document can be
identified with the corresponding argument component. Participants’ arguments for their
particular points of view can be compared either in a document view or in an argument tree
view.
Points of diversion identified between participants’ arguments can be discussed by focusing
on the particular issue (whether it be a claim value reason or a new data item)3. Once these
points of disagreement are identified the strength of each argument can be gauged. As with
the generic argument tree the strength of an argument is established by a simple voting
system. Fox and Krause (1992) argue that a simple function for computing the merit of an
argument simply determines the proportion of supporting arguments in the total set of
arguments (see Fox, 1991) and although we think of arguments as having different degrees
of force this is still an effective means of capturing the merit of an argument.

CONCLUSION
We have presented a conceptual system for the support of deliberative reasoning within online communities that has been partially implemented. The system separates the reasoning
into two parts by first involving participants in the development and agreement on the basic
structure of reasoning that will be used and then allows the development of individual points
2
GAAMtalk does not invoke inferences as the construction of the generic tree did not involve the development of
inference mechanisms.
3
Reasons for relevance and backings would, of course lead back to discussion of the generic tree and would require
strong support for returning to those structure considerations.
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of view within this framework. It permits both a visual annotated structure for the
representation of views as well as a document representation.
The quality of the discussions developed whilst using such a web-based application needs
to be investigated but we conclude by proposing that:
•

The argumentation frame is a practical way to represent arguments

•

Establishing the generic arguments in a domain can done by dialogue with
participants

•

Establishing the generic arguments in a domain engages the participants in
structuring and setting the terms of deliberation

•

Participant actual arguments are either instance of the generic or new arguments

•

The ability to add and delete data items and select inference mechanisms allows
the exercise of discretion

•

The choice of viewing a participant’s argument either as a graph or an XML
document helps focus on common points and recognize points of departure

•

The dialogue needed to impartially run a discussion can be automated by control
structures that iteratively implement the meta generic arguments outlined above.
Returning to the questions raised in the introduction. The framework and web application
presented need to be tested in order to assess whether they are effective in supporting
meaningful debate and produce better governed online communities. A detailed evaluation
program is being formulated that will focus on validity and verifiability, usability and social
benefit and impact.
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